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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
We are asked to determine if the delay of the Board of 
Revision and Review in reviewing a decision of an 
administrative law judge deprived the Board of jurisdiction 
under the facts of this appeal. We hold that it did, and that 
the Board's delay caused the ALJ's decision to become a 
final order that we now have jurisdiction to review. We 
further hold that the ALJ erred in deciding that a maritime 
employer is entitled to relief from the Special Fund 
established under S 8(f) of the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. S 901, et seq. 
("LHWCA") ("the Act"), where the employee's disability was 
not manifest during the time of his employment. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
 




Raymound Ehrentraut worked for Sun Ship, Inc. from 
1938 until his retirement in 1981. Nine years after he 
retired he was diagnosed with asbestosis resulting from his 
years of work-related asbestos exposure while at Sun Ship. 
The same month he was diagnosed, doctors discovered he 
also had a work-related pulmonary malignancy. 
Ehrentraut's asbestosis was a "pre-existing condition" that 
had made diagnosis of the malignancy more difficult. 
Ehrentraut eventually succumbed to the cancer and died 
on July 15, 1990. Thereafter, his wife applied to Sun Ship 
for death benefits under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act.1 
 
Sun Ship initially paid the requested benefits. However, 
in 1992, after paying benefits for 104 weeks, Sun Ship 
requested the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs to 
provide the payments from the Special Fund established 
under section 8(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. S 908(f). The 
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
denied Sun Ship's application. The Director concluded that 
Sun Ship was not eligible for relief from the Special Fund 
because Ehrentraut's pre-existing injury was not manifest 
while he worked for Sun Ship. However, the case was 
referred to an administrative law judge who overruled the 
Director's decision. On April 15, 1993, the ALJ issued an 
opinion declaring that Sun Ship was entitled to section 8(f) 
relief under the 1984 amendments to the Act because 
Ehrentraut's pre-existing condition was a long-latency 
disease diagnosed after Ehrentraut's retirement. See ALJ at 
3. 
 
The Director filed a timely appeal to the Benefits Review 
Board on May 13, 1993. However, the Board failed to 
adjudicate the appeal for more than three years. Finally, on 
September 12, 1996, the Board issued an order in which it 
reversed the ALJ's ruling and remanded the case back to 
the ALJ for further proceedings. The Director filed a Petition 
for Review seeking a judicial determination that the ALJ's 
order had become the final decision of the Board because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Both parties agree that she is entitled to death benefits under 33 
U.S.C. S 909. 
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the Board had not acted within the required time frame. 
The Director's petition asks us to reverse the ALJ's decision 
and hold that Sun Ship is not entitled to shift the 
responsibility for these benefits to the Special Fund. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We exercise plenary review over both the jurisdictional 
issue and the substantive issue raised by this appeal 
because both present questions of law. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 
1524, 1527 (3d Cir. 1992); cf. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. 
Rock, 953 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1992). Before addressing the 
substance of the Director's petition, we must first resolve 
the issue of our jurisdiction. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction to review the ALJ's decision as the Board's final 
order. We hold that the ALJ erred in concluding that Sun 
Ship is entitled to shift liability to the Special Fund that 




Ordinarily, the Board's remand to the ALJ would be an 
interlocutory order and we would therefore have no 
jurisdiction to review it. However, the Department of Labor 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 
1321 (the "Appropriations Act") provides that any ALJ 
decision in a LHWCA case that has been 
 
       pending a review by the Benefits Review Board for 
       more than one year shall, if not acted upon by the 
       Board before September 12, 1996, be considered 
       affirmed by the Benefits Review Board on that date, 
       and shall be considered the final order of the Board for 
       purposes of obtaining a review in the United States 
       courts of appeals. 
 
100 Stat. 1321-219 (emphasis added). Here, the Board 
issued its order on September 12, 1996. Sun Ship argues 
that is consistent with the requirements of the 
Appropriations Act. The Director responds that "before" 
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does not mean "on" and that the Board's September 12, 
1996 decision is therefore a nullity. 
 
It is axiomatic that our interpretation of any statute 
begins with the language of the statute. Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). If the language is ambiguous, we look to legislative 
history to determine congressional intent. Adams Fruit Co., 
Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 (1990). In addition, we 
will sometimes defer to a permissible interpretation of a 
statute by an appropriate agency. However, we will do so 
only when the statute does not directly speak to the issue 
and congressional intent cannot be gleaned from the text of 
the statute, or its legislative history. Only then, should the 
"question for the court [become] whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). When legislation 
speaks directly to a particular issue, it is that congressional 
expression, not a contradictory agency interpretation, 
which controls. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 
424, 430 (1981). 
 
Here, it is clear that the Board's decision is void if it did 
not comply with the Appropriations Act. We would then 
have jurisdiction under the Appropriations Act to review the 
ALJ's decision. However, Sun Ship argues that the Board 
obviously interpreted the Appropriations Act as allowing it 
to issue orders on September 12, 1996 because the Board 
issued several opinions on that day that had been pending 
for over a year. Sun Ship then relies upon Chevron to argue 
that we must defer to the Board's interpretation.2 However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to Sun Ship, the Board obviously interpreted the 
Appropriations Act as allowing it to act on September 12, and we must 
defer to that interpretation under Chevron. Chevron does state that a 
court should refrain from "substituting its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency," 467 U.S. at 844, however, we have not 
previously directly addressed the issue of the amount of deference owed 
the Director concerning the interpretation of the LHWCA. In Cort v. 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 996 F.2d 1549, 
1551-52 (3d Cir. 1993), we recognized a division of authority among the 
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Sun Ship's position ignores the well-settled rule that we do 
not defer to the Board's interpretation of statutes. See 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States Dep't of 
Health & Human Serv., 80 F.3d 796, 809 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 
1994)); cf. Elliot Coal Mining v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation, 17 F.3d 616, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Moreover, here, the Board's interpretation is contrary to the 
express language of the Appropriations Act. Accordingly, we 
will not defer as Sun Ship urges. 
 
Sun Ship also contends that the Appropriations Act, 
taken as a whole, is ambiguous, and that this "ambiguity" 
requires us to look beyond the plain meaning of the 
language to determine Congress' true intent. Sun Ship 
attempts to create ambiguity by referring to other 
provisions in the Appropriations Act that allow for action 
"after September 12[th]," or "beginning September 13th," 
rather than "before September 12th." For example, the 
statute provides that: 
 
       . . . no funds made available by this Act may be used 
       by the Secretary of Labor after September 12, 1996 to 
       review a decision under the [LHWCA] that has been 
       appealed and that has been pending before the 
       Benefits Review Board for more than 12 months, 
       except as otherwise specified herein . . . beginning on 
       September 13, 1996, the Benefits Review Board shall 
       make a decision on appeal of a decision under the 
       [LHWCA] no later than 1 year after the date the appeal 
       to the Benefits Review Board was filed. 
 
110 Stat. 1321. (emphasis added). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
circuit courts of appeals concerning the amount of deference afforded the 
Director, but we did not reach the issue. In Barnes & Tucker, we held 
that we "owed . . . deference to the Director, not to the Board, for the 
Director makes policy." Id. at 1527. However, both Barnes & Tucker and 
Elliot Coal Mining v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
17 F.3d 616, 626 (3d Cir. 1994) stand for the well established 
proposition that we "will not defer to an interpretation in an adversarial 
proceeding that strains the `plain and natural meaning of words'." 
Barnes & Tucker, 969 F.2d at 1527. 
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Such language does not render the Appropriations Act 
either ambiguous, or contradictory. The Act did not prevent 
the Board from acting on all matters on September 12th. 
Rather, the Board was merely prohibited from acting on 
September 12 to decide or dispose of matters that had then 
been pending for a year or more. This did not prevent the 
Board from deciding cases on September 12, 1996 that had 
been pending for less than one year as of that date. 
Similarly, beginning on September 13, 1996, the 
Appropriations Act established a one year cut-off date 
within which the Board had to resolve cases pending before 
it. Neither provision requires us to interpret "before" 
September 12, to mean "on or before" September 12, as 
Sun Ship urges. When "before" is used as a preposition, it 
refers to "an event or act preceding in time or earlier than, 
or previously to, the time mentioned." Blacks Law 
Dictionary, 154-55 (6th ed. 1990). References to "after 
September 12th" only address the disbursal of funds. 
 
It is difficult to imagine how Congress could have more 
clearly established the Board's deadline for acting. 
Congress decreed that the Board must act "before 
September 12th." In United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 
93-96 (1985), the Court held that a statutory requirement 
to act "prior to December 31" plainly meant that action had 
to be undertaken before that date and not on it. The same 
is true here.3 
 
On September 12, 1996 this case had been pending 
before the Benefits Review Board for more than three years. 
The Board failed to act before September 12, and its 
subsequent decision on September 12 is, therefore, a 
nullity under the Act. That conclusion is required by the 
language of the statute, and we have been directed to 
nothing in the legislative history that would suggest a 
different result. Thus, a contrary interpretation of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Finkle v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1984), in 
a quite different context, we interpreted the phrase"prior to a certain 
date." We held that language providing a specific date by which action is 
required is "unequivocal and establishes an enforceable renewal 
deadline." Id. at 1019. Although we were concerned with the provisions 
of an option contract, our analysis there is nevertheless helpful to our 
analysis of the meaning of the statute we interpret here. 
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Appropriations Act would have the effect of amending it to 
read "on or before September 12, 1996." Any such change 
must originate in Congress, not here. Accordingly, the 
Board's purported remand was a nullity, and the ALJ's 
grant of section 8(f) relief to Sun Ship became a final order 




A. The Special Fund Under S 8(f) 
 
Section 8(f) of the Act provides that when an employee 
with a pre-existing condition suffers an on-the-job injury or 
is afflicted with a work-related disease which, in 
combination with the pre-existing condition,4 causes a more 
severe, permanent disability, the employer can apply to the 
Director for relief from disability payments after the 
employer has made such payments to the employee for 104 
weeks. See 33 U.S.C. S 908(f)(1). 
 
The relevant text of the statute reads as follows: 
 
        In any case in which an employee having an existing 
       permanent partial disability suffers injury, the 
       employer shall provide compensation for such disability 
       as is found to be attributable to that injury based upon 
       the average weekly wages of the employee at the time 
       of the injury. If following an injury falling within the 
       provisions of subsection (c)(1)-(20) of this section, the 
       employee is totally and permanently disabled, and the 
       disability is found not to be due solely to that injury, 
       the employer shall provide compensation for the 
       applicable prescribed period of weeks provided for in 
       that section for the subsequent injury, or for one 
       hundred and four weeks, whichever is the greater . . . . 
 
        In all other cases in which the employee has a 
       permanent partial disability, found not to be due solely 
       to that injury, and such disability is materially and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There is no requirement that the pre-existing condition be work- 
related. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 204 
(1949). 
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       substantially greater than that which would have 
       resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the 
       employer shall provide in addition to compensation 
       under subsections (b) and (e) of this section, 
       compensation for one hundred and four weeks only. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 908(f)(1). 
 
The Special Fund was established in 1927 with the 
enactment of the LHWCA. It was created by 33 U.S.C. 
S 944, and was intended to spread liability for injuries 
sustained by employees with pre-existing conditions equally 
among all employers in the maritime industry.5 
 
       The Special Fund was originally enacted . . . to fund 
       expenditures [where] an employee received an injury 
       which alone caused only permanent partial disability, 
       but resulted in the employee's permanent disability 
       when combined with a previous disability, the employer 
       had to provide compensation for the disability caused 
       by the second or subsequent injury . . . .[T]he employee 
       would be paid the remainder of his compensation for 
       permanent total disability out of the Special Fund . . . 
 
Smith, The Special Fund Under The Longshore And Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 11 Mar. Law 71 (1986). The 
LHWCA was enacted "in response to a series of Supreme 
Court decisions that invalidated prior attempts to cover 
maritime workers under existing state compensation 
structures." Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation, 136 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1998). 
Those decisions resulted in a situation where the last 
employer was liable for injuries that became totally 
disabling only as a result of preexisting injuries for which 
the last employer had no responsibility, and over which, it 
had no control. The Supreme Court discussed this situation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Contribution to the Special Fund is mandatory for all maritime 
industry employers. Annual assessments are determined using the ratio 
of the employer's compensation payments under the LHWCA to the total 
compensation paid by all employers under the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. 
S 944(c)(2); see also Lawrence P. Postol, The Federal Solution to 
Occupational Disease Claims -- The Longshore Act and Federal Program 
21 Tort & Inc. L.J. 199, 229-30 (1996) (explaining how formula is 
utilized). 
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in Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & S. S. Co., and the modern 
interpretation of section 8(f) can be traced directly to that 
decision. In Lawson, an employee had lost the sight of one 
eye in an accident not connected to the maritime industry. 
He was later hired by a steamship company and thereafter 
injured in a work related accident that took the sight of the 
other eye leaving him totally blind, and permanently 
disabled. However, since the total disability did not result 
solely from maritime employment, an issue arose as to the 
scope of the maritime employer's liability for the total 
disability. The Court defined the issue as follows: "should 
the employer or the second injury fund6  . . . be liable for the 
balance of payments to equal compensation for total 
disability?" Id. 
 
The Court noted the problems caused by earlier decisions 
holding the last employer fully responsible for the effects of 
a second injury although total disability only resulted from 
the combined effect of the latter injury and a preexisting 
condition. In particular, the Court noted the prior decision 
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Nease v. Hughes Stone 
Co., 114 Okl. 170 (Okla. 1925), where the second employer 
had been held liable "for total compensation for loss of the 
second eye." Lawson, 336 U.S. at 203. The Court noted 
that 
 
       [a]fter the decision . . . thousands of one-eyed, one- 
       legged, one-armed, one-handed men in the State of 
       Oklahoma [lost their jobs] and [could] not get 
       employment. . . . The decision displaced between seven 
       and eight thousand men in less than 30 days in 
       Oklahoma. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Bath Iron 
Works, 136 F.3d at 41 (quoting Lawson). At the time 
Lawson was decided, S 8(f) provided 
 
       that if an employee receives an injury which of itself 
       would only cause permanent partial disability but 
       which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact 
       cause permanent disability, the employer shall provide 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The "Special Fund" under section 8(f) of the Act is often referred to 
as 
the "second injury fund." 
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       compensation only for the disability caused by the 
       subsequent injury: Provided, however, that . . . after the 
       cessation of the payments for the prescribed period of 
       weeks, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the 
       compensation that would be due for permanent total 
       disability. . . . out of the special fund. 
 
Id. at 200. The Court held that this "second injury 
provision" served a double purpose. "It protects the 
employer who has hired, say, a one-eyed worker who goes 
and loses his other eye and becomes a total disability." Id. 
at 202. However, it "also protects the worker with one eye 
from being denied employment on account of his being an 
extra risk. Now, . . . it is possible to protect both the 
employer and to protect the one-eyed employee also." Id. 
See also Bath Iron Works Corp., 136 F.3d at 40 (1st Cir. 
1998). The Court concluded that the protection of the Act 
could not have been intended only when the first disability 
resulted from a covered occupation. If the Act were so 
limited, the employers would still be reluctant to hire 
workers with pre-existing injuries. The problem was not the 
source of the pre-existing injury, but the fact that the 
worker who came to an employer with a disability posed a 
greater risk of becoming totally disabled while working for 
the subsequent employer. The Court in Lawson held that 
Congress had to intend "previous disability" as used in the 
Act to include a disability in fact, whether or not it occurred 
under circumstances covered by the LHWCA. Thus, it was 
necessary to allow the employer relief from the special fund 
even though the pre-existing injury was not related to an 
occupation covered by the LHWCA. 
 
Since Lawson, courts have interpreted the LHWCA in a 
manner that is consistent with the public policy of 
preventing discrimination against employees with pre- 
existing injuries. We have stated that "the underlying 
congressional purpose in creating the special fund was to 
encourage the employment of partially disabled persons." 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation v. Universal 
Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 575 F.2d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 
1978).7 Moreover, the congressional committee reports for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Several courts of appeals have held that the purpose is only to prevent 
discrimination. See C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' 
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the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA specifically affirm 
that section 8(f) relief is intended to "encourage the 
employment of handicapped workers." H.R. Rep. No. 1411, 
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1972). 
 
Congress initially created only two conditions precedent 
to section 8(f) relief. An employee had to have a preexisting 
partial disability, and that disability had to combine with a 
subsequent work injury to create a permanent, total 
disability. See 33 U.S.C. S 908(f)(1). However, the strong 
anti-discrimination policy endemic to the LHWCA gave rise 
to a third condition. That judicially created condition 
precedent to section 8(f) is known as the "manifestation 
requirement." This is the condition that is at the center of 
the instant dispute. 
 
B. The Manifestation Requirement 
 
The "manifestation requirement" arose because of the 
public policy against discrimination that has been read into 
the Act since Lawson. Courts have reasoned that an 
employer can not discriminate if it does not know of a pre- 
existing injury. Therefore, courts have required that the 
pre-existing injury be manifest in order to afford the 
employer relief from the special fund. However, courts were 
aware that at least two further problems could exasperate 
rather than ameliorate the problem that the law was trying 
to remedy. First, proving such knowledge is very difficult. 
Accordingly, courts credited the employer with knowledge of 
a preexisting condition which could have been discovered in 




Compensation Programs, 31 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1994); others 
hold that the purpose is encouraging maritime employers to hire 
disabled persons. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
Harris, 934 F.2d 548, 552 (4th Cir. 1991); Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. 
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 913 F.2d 1426, 
1429 (9th Cir. 1990). Still others refer to both preventing discrimination 
and encouraging employers to hire disabled persons. See American 
Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, 679 F.2d 81, 82 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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       [s]trong policy considerations dictate that only those 
       employers who hire the handicapped with knowledge of 
       their disabilities qualify for limited liability. . . . In view 
       of the difficulty of proving actual knowledge . . . the test 
       is ordinarily an objective one. Conditions that are 
       latent rather than manifest to a prospective employer 
       do not qualify as S 8(f) disabilities. 
 
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation, 542 F.2d 602, 608 (3d Cir. 1976). Allowing 
an employer to establish manifestation by way of 
constructive knowledge also addressed the concern that the 
policy of protecting employees would result in employers 
subjecting certain employees to exacting physical 
examinations for fear of not learning of a preexisting 
condition and becoming ineligible for section 8(f) relief. It is 
the availability of knowledge, rather than actual knowledge 
of the condition, that is relevant to determining 
manifestation. See Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 
575 F.2d at 456-57; cf. American Mut. Ins. Co. Of Boston v. 
Jones, 426 F.2d 1263 (D.C.Cir. 1970). Thus, an employer 
who demonstrates that it could readily have discovered the 
disability by looking at the employee's medical records is 
entitled to S 8(f) relief. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring 
Corp., 575 F.2d at 457. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation, 951 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 1991) ("An employer need not have actual knowledge of 
an employee's condition. If the condition is readily 
discoverable from the employee's medical record in the 
possession of the employer, knowledge of the condition is 
imputed to the employer."). Against this background, the 
vast majority of courts of appeals that have addressed the 
issue have agreed that an employee's disability must be 
manifest to the employer before the employer can seek relief 
from the special fund.8 The manifestation requirement is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, 31 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1994); Sealand Terminals, Inc. 
v. Gasparic, 7 F.3d 321, 323-24 (2nd Cir. 1993); Two "R" Drilling Co., 
Inc. 
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 894 F.2d 748, 750 
(5th Cir. 1990); Lambert's Point Docks, Inc. v. Harris, 718 F.2d 644, 648 
(4th Cir. 1983); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Cargill, Inc., 709 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); General 
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now widely accepted and was incorporated into the 1984 
amendments to the LHWCA through regulations 
promulgated under that Act. See 20 C.F.R.S 702.321(a) 
(1988).9 
 
Here, the Director denied Sun Ship's S 8(f) application 
because "no evidence [was] submitted to show that 
[Ehrentraut] had a manifest pre-existing permanent 
disability prior to his retirement from work in 1981. . . ." 
See Joint Appendix at 52; ALJ Op. at 2. However, Sun Ship 
raises an interesting issue of first impression in this circuit. 
It argues that the 1984 amendments to the LHWCA 
eliminated the manifestation requirement where, as here, 
the preexisting injury does not become manifest until after 
the employee retires. The ALJ accepted this argument and 
reversed the ruling of the Director. 
 
       We are convinced that Section 8(f) should be read 
       literally in considering disability from post-retirement 
       occupational diseases. Only in this way can Congress' 
       intent in passing the 1984 amendments be carried out. 
       To establish entitlement to relief from the special fund 
       for a post-retirement occupational disease, therefore, 
       the employer need only show that there is an existing 
       permanent partial disability combined with the same 
       and contributed to the resulting permanent total 
       disability. In such cases the manifestation requirement 
       will not be applied. 
 
ALJ Op. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dynamics Corp. v. Sacchetti, 681 F.2d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1982); Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Brandt Airflex Corp., 645 
F.2d 1053, 1058 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 
575 F.2d at 456; Duluth, M. & I. R. Ry. Co. v. United States Dep't Of 
Labor, 553 F.2d 1144, 1151 (8th Cir. 1977). But see American Ship Bldg. 
Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 865 F.2d 727, 
731-32 (6th Cir. 1989) (expressly declining to incorporate manifest 
requirement for S 8(f) relief). 
 
9. The regulations require that the applicant forS 8(f) limitation of 
liability must file an application with the district director containing 
"(iii) 
the basis for the assertion that the pre-existing condition relied upon 
was manifest in the employer. . . ." 20 C.F.R. S 702.321(a)(1). 
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Accordingly, we must determine what effect, if any, those 
amendments had on the operation of the manifestation 
requirement. 
 
C. The 1984 amendments 
 
Until 1984, no provision of the LHWCA enabled a 
maritime worker to collect disability payments for post- 
retirement occupational diseases. Congress rectified this in 
1984 by amending the LHWCA to provide workers with 
disability coverage for post-retirement long-latency 
occupational diseases.10 See Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639 (1984). However, nothing in the 
1984 amendments suggests a congressional intent to alter 
the requirements for qualifying for S 8(f) relief. Cf. Bath Iron 
Works Corp., 126 F.3d at 40. ("We can find nothing in the 
text of the Amendments, nor its legislative history, to 
suggest that Congress intended to alter the application of 
the manifestation requirement to requests for special 
relief."). Absent statutory language to the contrary, we must 
conclude that the congressional intent to extend relief did 
not include relaxing the manifestation requirement to allow 
employers' relief from the special fund under circumstances 
that would not previously have entitled them to such relief. 
 
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments clearly 
indicates a congressional desire to expand employer liability 
for post-retirement occupational disease, but it does not 
reflect a desire to allow employers to shift liability for such 
disability payments to S 8(f) when an employer unwittingly 
hires an individual whose work-related diseases were 
asymptomatic, and undocumented. Moreover, relevant 
portions of the House and Senate Committee reports 
concerning the 1984 LHWCA amendments suggest a 
congressional intention to maintain the manifestation 
requirement. The Senate Report states: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Here, Ehrentraut's asbestosis and his malignancy were both 
sustained while he worked at Sun Ship. However, that does not alter our 
inquiry under S 8(f). Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 600 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
                                15 
  
       Section 8(f) of the act was designed to encourage 
       employers to hire and retain disabled workers by 
       distributing much of the additional cost of industrial 
       injury attributable to pre-existing permanent 
       disabilities among all employers and carriers subject to 
       the act. An employer able to demonstrate actual, or in 
       some cases, constructive knowledge that an injured 
       worker had a permanent disability which pre-dated a 
       compensable injury is often able to shift to the Special 
       Fund the responsibility for paying a very substantial 
       portion of the amounts payable to the worker. . . . The 
       goals of section 8(f) remain valid. 
 
S. Rep. No. 98-81, at 34 (1983) (emphasis added). This 
report expressly reaffirms the congressional commitment to 
the manifestation requirement and also serves to clarify any 
questions concerning the purpose of S 8(f) relief. 
 
Likewise, the House Committee report states: 
 
       Section 8(f) was intended to encourage employers to 
       hire disabled workers and permits such employers to 
       distribute among all employers subject to the Act, 
       much of the cost of compensating such a worker 
       should the worker . . . suffer a subsequent injury. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-570, pt. 1, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2734, 2753. While this report does not 
address the manifestation issue, it states that special fund 
relief is intended to encourage employers to hire disabled 
workers. The ALJ based his interpretation of the 1984 
amendments upon the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Harris. However, we are not 
persuaded by the analysis in Harris. 
 
D. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 
       v. Harris 
 
In Harris, the court reasoned that Congress intended to 
save maritime employers money when it enacted the 1984 
amendments. The court looked to the legislative history of 
the 1984 amendments and concluded that "the 
amendments as a whole are intended to reduce the cost of 
Longshore coverage for employers in the covered industries 
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in a manner which will disturb, to the most limited extent 
possible, the rights and benefits which the Longshore Act 
provides." Id. at 551. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, the court recognized that this was not Congress' 
only objective. "Additionally, the amendments relating to 
post-retirement occupational diseases are meant to insure 
that long-latency occupational disease claimants do not 
continue to encounter the severe procedural hurdles which 
the Longshore Act has presented in the past." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court then reasoned that 
extending the manifestation requirement to the new 
category of benefits being conferred would be contrary to 
Congress' purpose in amending the LHWCA. The court 
concluded: "[w]hen these goals are considered in concert, it 
is clear that Congress meant for the 1984 amendments to 
insure that those suffering from long-latency occupational 
diseases receive benefits adequate to their needs without 
greatly increasing the cost of these benefits to the 
immediate employer by spreading the risk throughout the 
industry and defraying the increased costs by contributions 
to the fund." Id. The court added that there "is no 
suggestion that the relevant . . . amendments are intended 
. . . to encourage the hiring or continued employment of the 
handicapped." Id. Thus, the court held that the 1984 
enactment did not extend the manifestation requirement to 
the new category of post retirement disability coverage 
afforded under those amendments. 
 
The ALJ concluded that, under Harris, the manifestation 
requirement for pre-existing disabilities does not apply 
when total disability comes about as a result of a long- 
latency period post-retirement occupational disease. We 
disagree. First, we doubt that the employers' increased 
exposure was driven by, or intended to be circumscribed 
by, a countervailing policy of saving employers' money. 
Neither the text of the amendments, their legislative 
history, nor the substantial body of appellate decisions 
interpreting the Act suggest that we should ameliorate the 
greater exposure inherent in the amendments by reading 
the manifestation requirement out of the Act. Second, we 
do not understand how Congress could have sought to 
"disturb, to the most limited extent possible, the rights and 
benefits which the Longshore Act provides" as the Harris 
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court stated, while eliminating the manifestation 
requirement that has been a prerequisite to relief from the 
special fund almost since its creation more than 70 years 
ago. 
 
Had Congress wanted to expand liability only on the 
condition that the almost universally accepted 
manifestation requirement be eliminated, it could certainly 
have said so. A departure from the longstanding 
requirement of manifestation should emanate from the 
statute's text, not its ethers. Sun Ship was not aware of any 
risk from a pre-existing injury or condition when it hired 
Ehrentraut, and we fail to see why it should now be entitled 
to relief under section 8(f). We conclude that the more 
cogent analysis, and the better reasoned approach, is that 
set forth by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
Bath Iron Works Corp. We will not assume that Congress 
intended to effect a change in such a longstanding 
provision of the law by relying upon inference and 
jurisprudential deductions. Accordingly, we find the ALJ's 




For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Sun 
Ship is not entitled to shift liability to the Special Fund 
under S 8(f), and the decision of the ALJ will be reversed. 
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